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WORLDWIDE SAFE FLIGHT: WILL THE INTERNATIONAL




T HE AIR TRANSPORT WORLD's priorities have been dra-
matically transformed since September 11, 2001. The
United States Government's launch of a "war on terrorism" as a
result of the tragic World Trade Centre and Pentagon events has
catapulted "security" into the forefront of global air transport
concerns.
* D.C.L., LL.M., LL.B., M.A., B.A., McGill University, Montreal, Canada. Dr.
John Saba is both an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of Air and Space Law
(Faculty of Law) as well as a Lecturer in Economics at McGill University in
Montreal, Canada. He was also the Project Manager to the Air Transport Bureau
of the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Seminar prior to the
5th Worldwide Air Transport Conference in Montreal, March 22 - 23, 2003. For
five years during the late 1990s, he was President of the primary subsidiary of a
NASDAQ-traded information technology company.
The author drafted this article primarily on the basis of person-to-person
interviews with a number of ICAO officers from the Secretariat and
Representatives on the Council of the ICAO of Algeria, Australia, Canada, China,
France, India, Ireland and the United States, as well as the alternate
Representatives of France and Greece, in the spring of 2002 through early 2003.
The author also attended relevant ICAO Council meetings during the 166th
session (May/June 2002) and the 167th session (December 4, 2002) and refers to
applicable Secretariat documentation. Since the author is in no way a member of
the IFFAS apparatus, the author thereby cautions that there may be
developments outside of his knowledge that may affect the validity of some
comments and conclusions.
The author has written this article in his personal capacity such that its
contents should in no way be attributed to the ICAO, its officers or specific State
Representatives. The purposes of the article are to describe and analyze the
nature and scope of the problem as well as the various prominent proposed
solutions. The author seeks to provide decision-makers and citizens with the
necessary information to make intelligent choices and not to advocate any
particular position.
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The irony of this "war" is that it is unintentionally exacerbat-
ing the financial dilemma of an industry already squeezed with
exorbitant losses. These losses are the result of first, declining
revenues cause by a global macroeconomic slowdown, decreas-
ing passenger traffic, and lower airline pricing power; and sec-
ond, increasing costs resulting from challenges such as
skyrocketing fuel prices and security upgrade requirements.
This combination inevitably leads to significant airline consoli-
dation, restructuring, and bankruptcies.
The current environment of increasing security and large fi-
nancial losses makes other very urgent and continuing problems
appear as though they are being put on the back burner. The
growing and obvious crisis in aviation "safety" is one of the most
important problems that may become a victim of the fundamen-
tal economic principle of choice under scarcity. Given fixed
and sometimes declining budgets, States and airlines must
choose priorities - if more money is spent on security, necessa-
rily less money may be spent elsewhere, as on budgetary items
related to aviation safety.
The dilemma is that safety associated problems continue to
cause disproportionately more aviation-related deaths when
contrasted to deaths caused by security deficiencies. This dis-
crepancy is powerfully demonstrated in a recent study of the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In the 10-year
period of 1992-2001, aviation accident-related deaths due to
safety problems (for example, controlled flight into terrain
caused 33.77 percent of such deaths) were about ten times more
likely than deaths due to security breaches (3.87 percent of
deaths were caused this way-this includes passenger and crew
deaths of the aircraft not only in the September 11, 2001 events
but also in the inadvertent shooting down of a plane over the
Ukraine in that same year).'
The air transport industry's financial balancing act is continu-
ally being shaken by the vicissitudes of national, regional and
international politics. On one hand, most developing and less
developed countries (LDCs) attribute more importance to avia-
tion "safety" issues. On the other hand, the developed countries
tend to prioritize aviation "security." Somehow government and
industry budgeting must fairly account for both priorities.
I Accident Reporting, Air Navigation Commission Briefing, International Civil
Aviation Organization 3 (June 6, 2002).
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A United Nations specialized agency, the ICAO, has tried to
balance both priorities as it fulfills its obligation-under the
Chicago Convention of 1944 2-to insure the safe and orderly
growth of civil aviation throughout the world. The ICAO has
tried to reconcile differing positions among its 188 developed
and developing Member [Contracting] States on the balance
and priority to be attached to safety and security.
This paper focuses on the safety side of the ICAO's challenges
with respect to the creation of an International Financial Facility
for Aviation Safety (IFFAS). In early December 2002, after
lengthy deliberations, the Council of the ICAO established an
IFFAS to assist Contracting States of the Organization in financ-
ing aviation safety-related projects identified principally through
the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
(USOAP).4 The USOAP, since its creation inJanuary 1999, has
helped identify deficiencies in the implementation of safety-re-
lated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) 5 in
ICAO Contracting States. The primary purpose of the IFFAS is
to provide financial assistance to those States (primarily develop-
ing countries and LDCs) that have difficulty in securing the nec-
essary money through existing financing mechanisms and
procedures in order to apply corrective measures to the aviation
safety gaps discovered by the USOAP. 6
2 Convention on International Civil Aviation, openedfor signature, Dec. 7, 1944,
61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. In Article 43
of this Convention, it is stipulated that: "An organization to be named the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization is formed by the Convention. It is made up
of an Assembly, a Council, and such other bodies as may be necessary." Id. at art.
43. The ICAO decision-making process includes three principal levels: (1) the
Assembly may establish a policy priority by resolution; (2) the ICAO Council de-
liberates on and formulates the structures and/or rules based on this resolution;
and (3) the Secretariat supports both the Assembly and the Council through
research and implementation. The ICAO's headquarters are in Montreal,
Canada.
3 Id. at art. 44(a).
4 ICAO Press Release, Council of ICAO Establishes Global Financing Facility for Avi-
ation Safety (Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICAO Press Release]. The ICAO Universal
Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) will be discussed in greater detail
below. See infra part II(B).
5 The ICAO (i.e., its Council) has adopted 18 technical Annexes to the Chi-
cago Convention, establishing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
that are designed to ensure a minimum level of safety for international civil avia-
tion through technical uniformity. In turn, each State is responsible to assure
adherence to these SARPs.
6 See IC1 0 Press Release, supra note 4.
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The President of the Council of the ICAO, Dr. Assad Kotaite,
summarized the ICAO's position respecting IFFAS thus: "Avia-
tion safety is global in nature. For the entire system to be safe, all
elements must be equally safe. IFFAS is yet another tool at the
disposal of Contracting States in their on-going efforts to ensure
that every citizen of the planet can fly safely to and from any
destination in the world."7 He added: "The Council was unani-
mous on the importance of the mechanism to aviation safety
and in its contribution to furthering the ICAO's mandate of en-
couraging the safe and orderly development of international
civil aviation. "
This article examines the challenges posed by the USOAP,
identified deficiencies, and the IFFAS mechanism within the
context of the principles highlighted by Dr. Kotaite. Thus, four
topics will be studied: first, the nature and extent of the aviation
safety problem; second, existing solutions and approaches (tech-
nical and financial) to help remedy aviation safety deficiencies
in the developing/LDC countries (particularly as identified by
the ICAO's USOAP); third, proposed mechanisms (including
the IFFAS) to help correct the identified safety deficiencies; and
fourth, a conclusion as to whether the IFFAS is a valuable mech-
anism, even experimentally, to address the problem of assisting
certain needy developing/LDC countries in correcting their avi-
ation safety deficiencies.
II. THE PROBLEM: AVIATION SAFETY DEFICIENCIES
Most countries-developed, developing, and less developed
countries-acknowledge that there is an acute need to help
LDCs remedy aviation safety deficiencies since their resources,
financial and otherwise, are insufficient. However, States and
their domestic air transport industries disagree as to what mech-
anisms and procedures are preferred to meet this need. This
article reviews not only the nature but also the extent of the
problem.
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: WHY REMEDY AVIATION SAFETY
DEFICIENCIES IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES?
All States-developed and developing/LDC-have two im-
portant reasons for remedying the aviation safety deficiencies of
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ties on the ground-irrespective of citizenship-are at risk of
death or injury through aircraft accidents and crashes anywhere
in the world. Accordingly, some have stated that civil aviation
safety is an indivisible and global regime such that any recog-
nized aviation safety deficiency in one country threatens the
safety of the entire global civil aviation system."9
Statistical evidence supports this proposition. Internationally,
if the aviation accident rate is assumed to be held constant (at
the 1996 level) and projected growth rates double traffic volume
over the next ten to twelve years, it is projected that by 2015
there may be a serious accident every week. I" Regionally, one
study indicates that the developed regions of North America,
Western Europe, and Australia have the lowest fatal aviation ac-
cident rates, while developing countries have much higher acci-
dent rates. For example, airlines of Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States have the highest acci-
dent rate (indeed, 50 times higher than Western Europe). Air-
lines from Africa, Asia, and Central/South America have
accident rates at least twice as high as the world average. Thus,
it is evident that passengers and third parties on the ground are
put at risk by developing/LDC countrys' aircraft and aviation
infrastructure deficiencies. Developed country aircraft opera-
tors and citizens not only fly internationally to developing/LDC
country destinations, but developed country airports also re-
ceive flights from developing/LDC country aircraft operators. 12
A second reason for improving aviation safety in developing/
LDC States is that global economic development is closely con-
nected to a vibrant transportation industry, generally and a vital
air transport industry, particularly. Global economic develop-
ment is associated with four factors:
1) Air transport permits billions of developed country tourists
to travel to developing/LDC countries, thereby accelerating
9 Interviews with Taieb Cherif, Representative of Algeria on the Council of
ICAO (May 10, 2002 & Jan. 14, 2003). It should be noted that Dr. Cherif as-
sumed the position of Secretary-General of the ICAO on August 1, 2003, suc-
ceeding Mr. Renato Claudio Costa Pereira.
10 David Hinson, FAA Administrator, Commission of the European Communi-
ties, A European Community Contribution to World Aviation Safety Improvement 3 (July
16, 2001) [hereinafter EU Contribution].
I1 See Airclaims Limited, Special Report for IAPA: Study of Fatal Accident Data, Pas-
senger Flights and Number of Flights, Five Year Rolling Average, Western-Built Jet Aircraft
1989 to 1998 (Feb. 4, 1999). The period referred to here is 1994 to 1998.
12 See EU Contribution, supra note 10, at 5.
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their economic development specifically 13 and contributing to
the over $3.5 trillion USD to the travel and tourism industry
(about 12 percent of the world's Gross Domestic Product).
2) Global markets require fast and efficient transportation of
not only perishable goods from the developing/LDC countries
to the developed countries, but also finished products sent from
the developed to developing countries.' 4
3) The air transport industry and economic development de-
pends on the traveling public's confidence that air travel is
safe. 15
4) Developed country aerospace suppliers sell more aviation
products to developing/LDC countries when the latter adopt
developed country standardized and uniform air safety regula-
tions for aircraft, air traffic, and airport services.' 6
B. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
The world has become aware of the extent of aviation safety
deficiencies, particularly among certain developing and LDC
countries, largely because of the Universal Safety Oversight Au-
dit Programme (USOAP) of the ICAO. The USOAP reinforces
preliminary evidence of aviation safety deficiencies provided by
other programmes.
The first audits/assessments were those of the United States'
Federal Aviation Administration International Aviation Safety
Assessment (IASA) programme initiated in 1992. By the end of
the 1990s, the IASA had determined that over 40% of the coun-
tries assessed had insufficient oversight systems." A significant
regional mechanism is the European Safety Assessment of For-
eign Aircraft (SAFA) Programme, established by the European




17 This Programme continues to assess whether a non-US Civil Aviation Au-
thority (CAA) complies with international (ICAO) standards for aviation safety
oversight of the air carriers under its authority. The FAA is evaluating the safety
oversight system of each country, not the safety of its individual airlines. It assesses only
whether the oversight system is adequate to ensure that ICAO minimum stan-
dards are met, not the higher standards applicable in the U.S., the European
Community, and some other countries. For a more in depth explanation, see EU
Contribution, supra note 10, at 14.
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Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) and Europe's Joint Aviation
Authority (JAA) with support from the European Commission.'"
ICAO's mandatory USOAP 9 regime was created in November
1998. In the following three-year period, the ICAO Assembly
mandated initial audits (conducted under the auspices of
ICAO's Air Navigation Bureau) that were to verify State compli-
ance (i.e., effective implementation) of the Standards and Rec-
ommended Practices (SARPs) in three Annexes concerned
largely with the aircraft itself: Annexes 1 (personnel licensing),
6 (flight operations), and 8 (aircraft airworthiness including de-
sign, certification, and maintenance).
There were three main reasons for creating this programme.
First, the USOAP is a response to concerns about worldwide
compliance with minimum international aviation safety stan-
dards. Its ultimate objective is to promote global aviation safety
consistent with the ICAO's Global Aviation Safety Plan
(GASP) .20
Second, the programme is mandatory and applies to all Mem-
ber States in a systematic and regular way. It rectifies the failings
of its predecessor, the ICAO Aviation Safety Oversight Pro-
gramme (SOP), created by the ICAO Assembly in October 1995.
The SOP was plagued by not only the lack of financing (since
contributions were voluntary), but also by the fact that audits
were voluntary and were only carried out when requested by the
Member State, thus the SOP could not always be applied where
the need was greatest.2'
Third, the USOAP was created to reconcile a discrepancy be-
tween State legal obligations and lack of action to satisfy these
obligations. On one hand, the Chicago Convention and its An-
nexes impose a duty on individual States to assure aviation
safety. If these obligations are not fully respected by States, air
safety deficiencies arise and States have an obligation under Ar-
ticle 38 of the Chicago Convention to notify the ICAO of any
18 The SAFA Programme provides European States with a surveillance tool so
that they are made aware of and can act on proven deficiencies. It is largely
based on safety information gathered from all possible sources and on ramp-
checks of foreign aircraft. The Programme is applied to all foreign aircraft using
a European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) country's airports. The SAFA is
neither an assessment of a State's oversight capability nor a substitute for safety
oversight assessments. See EU Contribution, supra note 10, at 15.
19 Id.
20 U. Wickrama & R. Abeyratne, New Mechanism Would Provide Means of Raising
Funds for Impoilant Infrastructure Projects, ICAO JOURNAL, July/Aug. 2001, at 7-8.
21 Id.
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differences between their national regulations and practices and
the international standards contained in the Annexes.22 On the
other hand, despite these legal obligations, many contracting
States have been discovered to not properly satisfy their duty by
not applying and/or misinterpreting relevant SARPs. 23
The ICAO has been very successful with the USOAP, with 180
Contracting States and five territories having been audited by
ICAO teams betweenJanuary 1, 1999, and December 31, 2002.24
The results of these initial audits have been analyzed and sub-
mitted to the audited States. As expected, there were many
cases of aviation safety deficiencies resulting from State non-
compliance with the SARPs including: improper and insuffi-
cient inspections by State authorities before the certification of
air operators; maintenance organizations and aviation training
schools; licenses and certificates improperly issued, validated,
and renewed without due process; procedures and documents
improperly approved; failure to identify safety concerns; and
failure to follow-up on identified safety deficiencies and take re-
medial action to resolve such concerns. 25
As expected, the USOAP audits and follow-up procedures 26
have indicated that, while many States have remedied their non-
compliance after the audits, many States still fail to remedy avia-
tion safety deficiencies, often due to a lack of will, means, and/
or ability to do so.27 The analysis of the audit findings confirms
22 See supra note 5 for a discussion on ICAO (i.e., its Council) having adopted
18 technical Annexes to the Chicago Convention, establishing SARPs.
23 This discrepancy became a prominent issue when disclosed by the ICAO at a
November 1997 conference of Directors-General of Civil Aviation.
24 International Civil Aviation Organization, Annual Report of the Council
(2002), Doc. 9814, at 11 [hereinafter Annual Report of the Council (2002)].
25 H. Belai, Audit Analysis Helps Set Piorities for Addressing Safety Oversight Deficien-
cies, ICAO JOURNAL, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 19.
26 The USOAP provides that the ICAO, with the agreement and participation
of the State concerned, can proceed to the establishment of an Approved Action
Plan. This plan is intended to assist States to take the necessary recovery actions
to remedy the deficiencies identified by the safety audit so that they may fully
comply with the ICAO Annexes.
27 ICAO Council, Working Paper No. C-WP/11815, Apr. 18, 2002, at 2. The
ICAO Air Navigation Commission (ANC) has a "follow-up" audit programme "to
validate the implementation of States' corrective action plans, to identify any
problems encountered by States in such implementation, and to determine the
need for external assistance to resolve safety concerns identified in the course of
the audits." Id. Indeed, the ICAO has conducted an analysis of a sample of 34
States that compares their rate of non-compliance with specific critical elements
of safety oversight in the initial and follow-tip (a few years later) audits. While in
the initial audit there was 23.7% non-compliance, in the audit follow-tip a few
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that the serious difficulties in fulfilling safety oversight obliga-tions apply to specific States and regions disproportionately. In-deed, in many regions, audit findings show a direct relationshipbetween two factors: the higher the non-compliance to SARPs,the higher the aviation accident and incident rates in that
region.28
Developed and certain developing countries have the meansand the ability, and therefore, do remedy deficiencies. How-ever, many developing/LDC States have not committed ade-quate resources to the task. There are four major reasons whysuch audited States may lack the will, means, and/or ability to
remedy their safety deficiencies:1) Primary aviation legislation and regulations may be either
non-existent or inadequate (for example, a failure to pro-
vide adequate enforcement powers).2) Institutional structures that regulate and supervise aviation
safety often do not have the authority and/or autonomy to
effectively satisfy their regulatory duties.3) Human resources in many States may be plagued by a lack
of appropriate expertise largely due to inadequate funding
and training (and trained staff may leave government jobsfor better-paying jobs in the aviation industry).4) Financial resources allocated to civil aviation safety are in-
sufficient since many developing/LDC countries do notconsider this a high priority compared to other demands
such as health care, education, irrigation, and poverty.29Recognizing the nature and extent of the problem, the chal-lenge is to find some existing and/or new mechanisms to helpthe needy developing/LDC States remedy the audited aviation
safety deficiencies.
III. SOLUTIONS: TODAYS APPROACHES
Today, it is clear that there is a crisis of unremedied aviationsafety deficiencies in particular States and regions of the world.
years later, non-compliance dropped to only 8.7%. See id. at app. B graph, CriticalElements of a Safety Oversight System - Lack of Effective Implementation (%). It shouldbe noted that these follow-up statistics reveal two important trends: positively,many cases of aviation safety deficiencies have been remedied; but negatively,
"some of the States visited have not been able to implement their corrective ac-tion plan and require assistance to do so." Id. at 3. To the end of 2002, 67Contracting States had received an audit follow-up mission. See Annual Report ofthe Council (2002), supra note 24, at 11.
28 Belai, supra note 25, at 19-20.
29 See EU Contribution, supra note 10, at 4.
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While the ICAO has been performing the safety (and soon will
be doing security) audits of most countries, a question has arisen
as to the purpose of these safety audits.
Some critics of the slow process in remedying safety aviation
deficiencies have asked questions with respect to the objective of
USOAP audits. Is it negative, such that audit results information
is used as a way to blacklist certain States, airlines, and airports
for safety deficiencies? Is it positive, such that audit results infor-
mation may be used as a tool to improve international aviation
safety?
Let us turn to existing approaches (technical and financial)
that may help remedy aviation safety deficiencies in the develop-
ing/LDC countries. It must be recognized that assuring that all
States fully comply with minimum aviation safety standards is a
much more expensive and demanding undertaking than the au-
diting/assessment process.
A. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
To help needy developing/LDC States remedy aviation safety
deficiencies, they are often directed to apply to existing and/or
evolving technical cooperation and assistance institutions and
programmes at the international, regional, bilateral, multilat-
eral, and plurilateral levels.
1. International Technical Assistance
The worldwide development of civil aviation since World War
II has resulted in a reduction in aviation safety deficiencies in
developing/LDC countries. They have gradually acquired
equipment, facilities, and services so as to conform to ICAO's
minimum international standards (SARPs) primarily through
the work of the ICAO's Technical Co-operation Bureau (TCB) 30
and Technical Co-operation Programme (TCP). 31
30 The Technical Cooperation Bureau (TCB) of the ICAO provides advice and
technical assistance to developing and LDC countries for civil aviation. The TCB
receives administrative fees to fund itself by carrying out civil aviation projects in
developing/LDC countries with three main funding sources: (1) the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) (this is a declining source); (2) Devel-
oping countries' self-funding sources; and (3) other financing institutions.
31 The Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) of the ICAO focuses on aer-
onautical training. Again, there has been a decline in funding by the UNDP.
However, this reduction has been partly compensated by governments that in-
creasingly provide partial financing for their own civil aviation projects (through
cost-sharing) and/or trust funds provided by third parties such as other
governments.
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This progress can significantly be attributed to the funding of
the TCB through the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP),3 - which for many years approved financing to assist in
remedying aviation safety deficiencies of developing countries.
However, over the last ten years, UNDP funding priorities have
changed to divert funding from a lower priority item, like civil
aviation, in favor of health, education, agriculture, water purifi-
cation, and poverty reduction. Thus, civil aviation projects are
expected to be self-financed through a variety of public and pri-
vate funding sources (but no longer the UNDP), with the ulti-
mate goal being that commercial revenues provide cost
recovery.
Despite a lack of UNDP funding, the ICAO Council has ap-
proved the TCB funding project feasibility studies for appropri-
ate aviation infrastructure safety-related projects (e.g., traffic
forecasts, radar installation) in developing/LDC countries.?
While the ICAO, through the TCB, provides some technical as-
sistance to needy countries by preparing feasibility studies, the
TCB can only prepare limited studies that are less than the com-
32 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the United Na-
tions' largest provider of grants for "sustainable human development." The
UNDP grants assistance only at the request of governments and in response to
their priority needs that must be incorporated into national and regional plans.
The funds are primarily spent to secure international and national expertise,
technical services, and equipment. In the mid-1990s, the UNDP often gave over
$30 million USD annually for projects that the ICAO implemented. However,
the ICAO has progressively received less money from this source. For example:
Generally, "UNDP-funded projects, including cost sharing in which most of the
funds were provided by the Government, recorded a [significant further] de-
crease in 2002. Expenditures on inter-country projects decreased 55% from
$3,563,905 in 2001 to $1,616,295 in 2002 and country project expenditures de-
creased 62% [between 2001 and 2002]." See Annual Report of the Council
(2002), supra note 24, at 39. In the case of the ICAO, "UNDP core funding in
2002 amounted to [only] $752,000 . . . ICAO project expenditures under the
UNDP programme, which was mostly cost sharing and included projects for
which ICAO acted as Implementing Agency, were $26.6 million in 2002, com-
pared with $52.4 million in 2001." Id. at 38.
33 These studies are presently funded by two methods: (1) by voluntary contri-
butions of a generous third country that wants to help a particular country and its
project; or (2) a few hundred thousand dollars transferred annually to the TCB
from a small internal ICAO trust fund (this fund was established by the ICAO to
hold dues paid in arrears and to be spent for ICAO-related purposes) for the
purpose of the preparation of project documents for remedial action in coun-
tries, generally. (The TCB has decided to direct part of these funds to country-
specific feasibility studies). Interview with A.P. Singh, Representative of India on
the Council of ICAO (May 15, 2002). See also, International Civil Aviation Organ-
ization, Annual Report of the Council (2001), Doc. 9786, at 45.
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plete and more detailed project reports that the financing insti-
tutions want.34
2. Regional Technical Cooperation
Several different regional technical cooperation/self-help ap-
proaches are being tried that many developed countries sup-
port. One approach involves certain countries organizing
themselves regionally for a common aviation purpose with a
view of rationalizing their costs and the regional employment of
the needed resources. For example, while six countries may not
be able to afford to hire four safety oversight inspectors each,
they may be able to pool their resources and maybe hire ten
inspectors for their region (this concept has been applied re-
gionally by six Central American Member States in the Central
American Corporation for Air Navigation Services: Corporacion
Centroamericana de Servicios de Navigacion Aerea
(COCESNA) regional association respecting their oversight/
monitoring and upgrading of their aviation infrastructure).
The mechanisms to collect whatever charges or taxes are neces-
sary to finance these activities are regionally developed and ap-
plied. 5  A second approach involves groups of more
economically developed developing countries (for example,
North Africa) helping neighboring regions of poorer develop-
ing/LDC countries (for example, sub-Saharan Africa) to finance
and implement aviation infrastructure upgrades. 36
3. Bilateral, Multilateral and Plurilateral Technical Assistance
Developed donor States often prefer to provide assistance to
developing/LDC countries in civil aviation safety projects
through bilateral, multilateral, or plurilateral mechanisms.
However, there are two limitations to this approach that are
shared with the international assistance framework: first, recipi-
ent developing/LDC countries frequently channel resources to
priorities like health, education, agriculture, water purification,
and poverty reduction rather than civil aviation; and second,
most developed donor States insist that civil aviation projects be
largely self-financed through public and private funding sources
with an ultimate objective of revenues assuring cost recovery.
34 Id.
15 Interview with Daniel Galibert, President of the Air Navigation Commission
of ICAO (May 7, 2002).
- Id.
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a. Bilateral Technical Assistance
Some developed donor States prefer that their limited techni-
cal assistance money help particular regions, sub-regions or indi-
vidual countries, using a bilateral and directed approach, rather
than international mechanisms, for three main reasons. First,
such an approach may assure that the money is spent in the area
that the donor State desires.3 7 Second, this approach often pro-
vides more transparency, accountability, and effective auditing,
than international assistance mechanisms. Countries like the
United States may already have mechanisms (e.g., the FAA) to
achieve these goals 8.3  Third, developed countries may want to
help by using a "bottom up" bilateral and regional approach
(rather than the "top down" use of international mechanisms),
since funds are channeled to recipient neighbor countries and
regions benefiting the donor's political and economic interests.
For example, Canada and the United States are involved in such
projects (with Inter-American Development Bank cooperation).
Suggestions have been made that more developed countries in
East Asia, like Japan and Korea, might do something similar to
help their Asian neighbors. 9
Bilateral assistance assumes a special character when donor
States are members of a regional group like the European
Union. European Union (EU) States individually-and, possi-
bly in the future, through a variety of European Union mecha-
nisms-are already channeling some technical assistance to
those countries regionally close to them in Eastern Europe and
Africa. France's civil aviation regulatory authority (DGAC) is
helping former colonies, Cambodia and Vietnam, to develop
and upgrade their civil aviation codes to be consistent with Eu-
rope's Joint Aviation Requirements (JARs).
b. Multilateral Technical Assistance
Multilateral technical assistance is best illustrated by the EU
and its Commission that encourages European Union initiatives
to improve aviation safety globally. Thus, the European Com-
mission has proposed initiatives including cooperation with Eu-
37 Interview with Jonathan Aleck, Representative of Australia on the Council of
ICAO (July 29, 2002).
38 Interview with Edward W. Stimpson, Representative of the United States on
the Council of ICAO (May 14, 2002).
39 Interviews with Lionel Alain Dupuis, Permanent Representative of Canada
on the Council of ICAO (Apr. 26 & Aug. 15, 2002).
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rope's Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) and EUROCONTROL to
assist future EU members (from Central and Eastern Europe)
and to finance safety recovery programmes. Moreover, discus-
sions continue with respect to not only the joint and comple-
mentary goals and priorities of EU Member States, but also to
the need to establish a co-ordination mechanism for actions
taken by EU Member States to avoid duplication of governmen-
tal spending.40
c. Plurilateral Technical Assistance
A developing concept, structure, and process of technical as-
sistance is plurilateralism, which expands associates to include
not only recipient and donor States (bilaterally, multilaterally,
and/or internationally) but also "the efforts, experience and...
resources of international [e.g., ICAO, IATA] and regional orga-
nizations, aviation manufacturers, financial and other funding
institutions."4" The ICAO established a Global Aviation Safety
Plan (GASP) in 2001 and during the ICAO's 33rd Assembly of
September/October 2001 acknowledged the existence and de-
sirability of this group of senior aviation experts being empow-
ered to study their region's aviation safety problems and
recommend the best ways to improve safety and provide assis-
tance regionally. 2 Thus, the ICAO has rendered the mecha-
40 See EU Contribution, supra note 10, at 11-12.
41 This explanation of the GEASA (Group of Experts on Aviation Security,
Safety and Assistance) concept was formalized within the ICAO framework in its
Resolution A33-16 Global Aviation Safety Plan (2001). The Assembly provided
the quoted phraseology to resolve clause 14 of the Resolution.
42 ICAO Assembly, Resolution A33-16, Global Aviation Safety Plan (2001), availa-
ble at www.icao.org (last visited on Aug. 30, 2003).
One of the primary objectives of ICAO is to promote the safety of
civil aviation worldwide. With 188 Contracting States, and its active
involvement in global aviation safety issues, ICAO is well-positioned
to assume a coordinating role with respect to the many safety initia-
tives under way worldwide all with the common aim of reducing the
number and rate of aviation accidents. Recognizing this, in 1997
the Air Navigation Commission proposed an ICAO Global Aviation
Safety Plan (GASP) to the ICAO Council. In 1998, the 32nd Ses-
sion of the Assembly adopted Resolution A32-15: Global Aviation
Safety Plan, which, amongst other things, urged all Contracting
States to support the various elements of GASP. A progress report
on GASP was submitted to the 33rd Session of the Assembly in 2001
which then adopted Resolution A33-16, containing an updated
GASP and superseding Resolution A32-15.
The GASP serves to focus the safety-related activities within ICAO
on those safety initiatives, either planned or in progress, that offer
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nism of the Group of Experts on Aviation Security, Safety and
Assistance (GEASA) as an internationally recognized approach
based on the 1995 precedent of the Asia-Pacific Economic Com-
munity (APEC) Transportation Ministers that convened such a
group of experts to review and recommend the best ways to im-
prove safety and provide assistance in their region. This ap-
proach continues today in the Asia-Pacific region.13
Some countries are applying this framework in their own re-
gions. For example, Canada and the United States participated,
in the period of April 4-5, 2002, at a GEASA with experts from
seven South/Central American and Caribbean countries, the
ICAO, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the
Central American Oversight Agency (ACSA).4" The European
Union is studying this approach, particularly in reference to
technical assistance to Eastern Europe and Africa.45
B. FINANcIL ASSISTANCE
Financial assistance is clearly a second important approach
for developing/LDC countries to remedy their USOAP audited
the best safety dividend in terms of reducing accident numbers and
rates worldwide.
The objectives of the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan are to:
a) reduce the number of accidents and fatalities irrespective of the
volume of air traffic; and
b) achieve a significant decrease in worldwide accident rates, plac-
ing emphasis on regions where these remain high.
This should be achieved by:
a) identifying repetitive causes for accidents on a worldwide and a
regional basis and recommending specific actions;
b) enhancing identification of all elements that can impair safety,
such as shortcomings and deficiencies in the air navigation sys-
tem or lack of compliance with ICAO Standards and Recom-
mended Practices (SARPs), and recommending corrective
actions; and
c) enhancing the cooperation between Contracting States or
groups of States with ICAO in order to improve ICAO's own
capability to compile, assess and disseminate safety-related
information.
1.3 The ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan will therefore identify
those tasks and programmes likely to produce the best safety divi-
dend in terms of reducing accident numbers and rates both on a
worldwide and on a regional basis ......
43 Interview with Lionel Alain Dupuis, Permanent Representative of Canada
on the Council of ICAO (Apr. 26, 2002).
44 Stimpson, supra note 38; see also Dupuis, supra note 43.
45 Dupuis, supra note 43.
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aviation safety deficiencies including borrowing from: (1) com-
mercial banks; (2) regional development banks and funds; (3)
international banks and other institutions; and (4) export credit
agencies and bilateral development institutions.
1. Commercial banks
Commercial banks are reluctant to lend money to develop-
ing/LDC countries. Both the aviation industry generally and
the type of clients (LDCs) are considered too high risk given the
small return on investment in the aviation industry.
2. Regional Development Banks and Funds
A promising source of financing to assist countries is regional
development banks and affiliated funds. The main such banks
include the Islamic Development Bank (IDB),"" African Devel-
opment Bank (AFDB) ,47 Asian Development Bank (ADB)," and
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, also called the
IDB) .40
The availability and extent of the financial assistance provided
by these banks and funds suffer from three principal con-
straints. First, these mechanisms generally attach little priority
to the improvement of aviation infrastructure and services, pre-
ferring to channel funds to such objectives such as reducing
poverty.5" The IDB is a special case since it broadens its loan
priorities to include not only poverty reduction but also sector
reform and modernization. Indeed, the upgrading of the avia-
tion sector might be interpreted as within the IDB's priorities, as
illustrated in late 2001 by the IDB's Multilateral Investment
46 For a more detailed discussion, see ICAO Council, Working Paper No. -
WP/11840, May 21, 2002, app. B-2.
47 Id. at app. B-1.
48 Id. at app. B-2., 3.
49 Id. at app. B-1.
50 Interview with A.P. Singh, Representative of India on the Council of ICAO
(May 15, 2002). It should be noted that since the time of the interview, Ambassa-
dor Singh has become the Director of the Bureau of Administration and Services
of ICAO. At the time of the interview, Ambassador Singh indicated that these
banks follow a procedure that effectively excludes loans to LDCs for remedying
aviation safety deficiencies. These banks stipulate to the applicant LDC that
there is a fixed amount available for the country's development with "soft"/con-
cessional loans; however, these banks stipulate a number of priorities (such as
programmes for poverty alleviation, education, water supply purification, health
care, rural road infrastructure, etc.) that do not include aviation infrastructure
improvement.
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Fund (MIF), which created a $10 million line of activity to help
Latin American and Caribbean countries improve airport secur-
ity in the aftermath of the September 11 th World Trade Centre
tragedy (for example: recently the MIF approved almost one
half million dollars as a grant to Nicaragua to support a project
to strengthen security at Managua's international airport).51
Second, the lending policies and practices of such banks and
funds apply such demanding criteria that loans tend to be lim-
ited to creditworthy countries; therefore, this effectively ex-
cludes the more needy but credit risky developing/LDC
countries.52 Third, there is no mechanism to help the potential
financial assistance recipients to professionally prepare project
proposals and satisfy project management requirements and
documentation procedures when they apply to regional devel-
opment banks.53
Regional development banks sometimes partner with a donor
and recipient State. For example, recently the Netherlands (i.e.,
its Ministry of Transport, through its Aviation Technical Assis-
tance Programme) and the European Investment Bank jointly
provided seed money, expertise, and/or equipment to aviation-
related projects in Tanzania.54
3. International Banks and Other Institutions
Current international mechanisms are not very helpful in fi-
nancing aviation safety deficiency projects. First, the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) has dramatically
reduced its financing of aviation infrastructure, training, and
the like. Second, other international financing mechanisms are
sector specific and do not generally extend loans or other assis-
tance in the aviation sector (for example, the United Nation's
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) restricts its efforts to
the agricultural sector). Third, the World Bank is not presently
involved in the aviation sector.
51 Working Paper No. C-WP/11840, supra note 46, at app. B-I.
52 Singh, supra note 50.
53 Interview with Jonathan Aleck, Representative of Australia on the Council of
ICAO (Apr. 30, 2002).
54 Interview with Bert Kraan, Senior Project Manager, Safety and Security, De-
partment of Civil Aviation of the Netherlands (May 28, 2002). One project in-
volves an estimated $10 million USD to provide air navigation and
communications equipment; another project requires an estimated $13 million
USD to install a back-up power supply in Tanzanian airports for the emergency
cases when power goes down due to inclement weather.
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4. Export Credit Agencies and Bilateral Development Institutions
Export credit agencies exist in many developed countries to
assist and/or subsidize the domestic production and provision
of aviation infrastructure and equipment. These institutions
may eventually be used to help finance safety-related aviation
infrastructure equipment and projects. A key constraint, how-
ever, is that these exports must be creditworthy-a requirement
that certain aviation safety improvements in the developing/
LDC countries do not meet. Export credit agencies include, the
Export Development Corporation (EDC) (Canada), Compagnie
Fran ,aise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Ext6rieur (COFACE)
(France), Hermes (Germany), Export Credits Guarantee De-
partment (ECGD) (United Kingdom), and Export-Import Bank
(Ex-Im Bank) (USA).
Bilateral development agencies operate in some developed
countries. In principle, these agencies may get involved in par-
ticular cases to remedy aviation safety deficiencies of LDCs; how-
ever, in practice they generally do not. Such agencies include,
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (Canada),
Agence Fran:aise de Developpement (AFD) (France), Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID) (United King-
dom), and United States Agency for International Development
(USAID).
IV. REMEDYING AVIATION SAFETY DEFICIENCIES:
PROPOSED MECHANISMS
On one hand, there is an international consensus of the need
to identify aviation safety deficiencies worldwide (with almost
universal praise for the ICAO's successful USOAP programme).
On the other hand, there is much disagreement as to whether
the ICAO is the best mechanism to help developing/LDC coun-
tries remedy their identified aviation safety deficiencies when
these States lack the ability and means to do so. Thus, the ques-
tion is, does the ICAO have a role in helping remedy identified
aviation safety deficiencies-and, if so, how?
The following discussion is divided into three issues: 1) deter-
mining the nature and scope of the ICAO's role in assisting the
remedy of identified aviation safety deficiencies, which includes
a study of arguments for and against a broad role for the ICAO
in this area; 2) if there is an ICAO role, describing the history,
functions/objectives, and proposed structure and operations of
the IFFAS; and 3) the future of the IFFAS.
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A. ISSUE 1: DETERMINING THE ICAO's ROLE IN ASSISTING THE
REMEDY OF IDENTIFIED AvIATION SAFETY DEFICIENCIES
The ICAO is committed through the USOAP to perform
mandatory, permanent and universal auditing/assessment of
the way its contracting States apply certain standards (found in
the three Chicago Convention Annexes mentioned earlier) for
which they are responsible. However, the USOAP is also, in ef-
fect, a voluntary programme since the ICAO has no legal power
to obligate the States to accept these audits and inspections.
The ICAO must conclude bilateral agreements with each of the
States on a voluntary basis.55
The present consensus is to expand the USOAP to cover the
auditing of the implementation of all safety-related SARPs. The
next phase is to add auditing of SARPs related to air traffic man-
agement, airport services and security. However, the ICAO faces
two constraints in broadening the USOAP mandate: first, a re-
stricted budget makes such audits very expensive; and second,
non-remedied safety deficiencies persist in States that represent
only one percent of international aviation activities.56
The challenge is to find appropriate mechanisms-beyond
the technical and financial assistance discussed above-to fund
aviation safety projects, particularly in developing /LDC coun-
tries. 57 One option that has been suggested is to establish inde-
pendent entities such as publicly owned corporations; however,
in the developing/LDC world, adequate funding is unlikely
given limited resources and other pressing priorities like health,
education, agricultural and industrial modernization, and re-
ducing poverty. A second possibility proposed is to privatise air
navigation services and airport facilities. A third alternative con-
sidered is to provide financing through an investment banking
mechanism. At this point, it is recognizable that the last two
options are unrealistic in most developing/LDC countries since
cost-recovery and a positive return-on-investment is unlikely
given inadequate revenues due to low traffic volume.
A fourth option suggests pre-funding of the solutions through
a charges/fees system imposed on airline passengers. A disad-
vantage of this mechanism is that specific developing/LDC
55 See EU Contribution, supra note 10, at 7.
56 Id.
57 See Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Funding an International Financial Facility for Avia-
tion SafetyJ. OF WORLD INVESTMENT, Dec. 2000, 384-88 for an interesting summary
and analysis of the four options discussed hereafter.
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countries may be unable to collect enough to recover costs.
Moreover, this approach works better if it is applied regionally
or best, internationally, which is extremely unlikely.
In the context of the limitations of existing and proposed
mechanisms for assisting needy developing/LDC countries rem-
edy their aviation safety deficiencies, there has been much de-
bate as to whether the ICAO should assume a broad role,
particularly through an IFFAS mechanism.
1. The Case for a Strong IFFAS: Favouring a Broad ICA 0 Role
There are five main arguments suggested to encourage the
development of a strong IFFAS with a broad ICAO role. It must
be recognized that largely developing and LDC States are the
principal proponents of an expanded ICAO role in assisting the
remedy of aviation safety deficiencies identified in their
countries.
First, these developing and LDC States envision an IFFAS
structure that is a quasi-independent, self-financed entity (i.e.,
outside of the ICAO's regular Programme Budget) made up of
States that volunteer to be members and participants in its
activities.
Second, many of the proponents of an expanded role of the
ICAO through the IFFAS argue that the ICAO might be re-
stricted to three main responsibilities: (1) to supervise the IFFAS
and make certain that any deficiencies identified through its au-
diting process are remedied; (2) to supply administrative and
technical service support to the IFFAS (to minimize IFFAS costs)
on a cost-recovery basis;58 and (3) to authorize payment to the
suppliers-not the client States-of the goods and services con-
tracted through its audited finance processes.59
Third, advocates of a strong IFFAS define the ICAO's role and
scope of functions broadly. In line with this reasoning, they cite
two principal arguments. First, these proponents argue that the
ICAO's responsibilities are not limited to monitoring, auditing,
and establishing global standards and recommended practices,
but also to applying to the regulation and enforcement of the
minimum universal standards it formulates. Thus, the ICAO
58 For example, the ICAO's Secretariat processes might be used not only to
help procure the client State's aviation goods and services, but also to finally
certify their delivery at quality assured standards through the Technical Coopera-
tion Bureau of the ICAO.
59 Singh, supra note 50.
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must not only disclose aviation safety deficiencies through its
USOAP programme, but must also help developing/LDC coun-
tries that do not have the means to remedy these deficiencies.6 °
As a result, the ICAO's 33rd Assembly decided to establish a
mechanism (named the International Financial Facility for Avia-
tion Safety (IFFAS)) with the purpose of "financing safety-re-
lated projects which States cannot otherwise provide or obtain
the necessary financial resources" to help remedy "safety-related
deficiencies identified through the ICAO USOAP." 61
Second, some proponents of a strong IFFAS also emphasize
that an IFFAS (in assisting needy States remedy aviation safety
deficiencies) may be a mechanism that reconciles the legal obli-
gations of the States and the ICAO under the Chicago Conven-
tion.62 On one hand, States have a legal obligation to regulate
and assure safe civil aviation within their jurisdiction. On the
other hand, according to the Chicago Convention, the ICAO is
responsible for ensuring worldwide safety and efficiency in air
transport.63 Indeed, the ICAO Council can intervene in cases
where the Council believes that "the airports or other air naviga-
tion facilities ... of a Contracting State are not reasonably ade-
quate for the safe, regular, efficient, and economical operations
of international air services." 64 Furthermore, it can be argued
that the Council has an obligation to make recommendations
for remedying the situation since the Council "shall consult di-
rectly with the State concerned, and others affected, with a view
to finding means by which the situation may be remedied, and
60 Interview with Taieb Cherif, Representative of Algeria on the Council of
ICAO (May 10, 2002).
61 See ICAO Assembly, Resolution A33-10, Oct. 2001, art. 2(a) [hereinafter Res-
olution A33-10] ; Cherif, supra note 60 (emphasizing this provision of the Assembly
resolution to give legal context to this position).
62 Cherif, supra note 60.
63 Id. The logic resulting in this conclusion is as follows: There is a pivotal
objective in the Chicago Convention that requires the ICAO (as the entity re-
sponsible for the international regulation of civil aviation) to "insure the safe and
orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world." Chicago
Convention, supra note 2, at art. 44(a).
The word "insure" places upon the ICAO the responsibility to assure that interna-
tional civil aviation grows safely and in an orderly manner. Furthermore, the
ICAO is obliged to "meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular,
efficient and economical air transport." Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at art.
44(d). Therefore, the Chicago Convention provides that the Contracting States
of the ICAO will hold the ICAO accountable for ensuring safety and efficiency in
air transport. See Abeyratne, supra note 57, at 393.
64 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at art. 69.
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may make recommendations for that purpose. 65 Later, a Con-
tracting State may conclude an arrangement with the Council
for giving effect to such recommendations.66 Thus, proponents
of a broad role for the ICAO argue that the ICAO must not
restrict itself to identifying and informing the audited States of
aviation safety deficiencies through its USOAP. Accordingly, the
ICAO and its Council have the added responsibility of recom-
mending remedies and assisting needy countries if they are not
able to rectify these problems on their own. 67
Fourth, advocates of a strong IFFAS highlight the failure of
existing technical and financial assistance mechanisms to help
developing/LDC countries in remedying aviation safety
deficiencies.6
Fifth, an interesting legal and hypothetical challenge has
been suggested by some of those who want an active role for the
ICAO in helping remedy safety deficiencies. They focus on po-
tential State liability because of a State's prior knowledge (actual
or implied/constructive)" that a specific country is not respect-
ing its international obligations under the Chicago Convention
- the State has knowledge of these safety gaps since aviation
safety deficiencies have been identified through the ICAO
USOAP. Thus, the issue is whether such a State's prior knowl-
edge implies an obligation on it to inform its citizens of the defi-
ciency in the non-conforming country such that its citizens
might avoid the airspace and/or aircraft of the non-conforming
country for safety reasons. If the informed State, despite this
knowledge, fails to inform its citizens of these risks, and one of
its citizens is injured or dies in a plane crash, is the plaintiff's
State legally liable for such effects in wrongful death damages?
While this article does not address complex sovereign immunity
65 Id.
66 Id. at art. 70.
67 Cherif. supra note 60.
6 Singh, supra note 50.
6 The process of implying that one State has knowledge of another State's
aviation safety deficiencies must be qualified. The USOAP is constrained by a
memorandum of understanding (signed by the States) that established the Uni-
versal Safety Oversight Audit program in 1999, which provides that the results of
the audits of all States are known by the ICAO; however, each individual State's
audit results are confidential and may only be disclosed to other States and entities
if the State agrees to the disclosure. Nevertheless, States do become aware of
individual deficiencies through bilateral exchanges and other ways. Further-
more, certain countries (for example: the USA through its FAA and International
Aviation Safety Assessment (TASA) programme) have their own auditing mecha-
nisms that give them actual knowledge.
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issues that might result, it must be acknowledged that litigable
principles may arise in such a case.
2. The Case Against a Strong IFFAS: Preferring a Limited ICAO
Role
There are four important arguments that have been sug-
gested in building the case for a more limited role of the ICAO
in assisting the remedy of aviation safety deficiencies identified
in developing/LDC countries. Primarily, but not exclusively, de-
veloped States have suggested these concerns.
First, advocates of this position suggest that the ICAO's func-
tions should be narrowly construed to be limited to only the
monitoring, auditing, and establishing of global SARPs. Moreo-
ver, it is argued that the ICAO should restrict itself to identifying
aviation safety deficiencies through its USOAP programme and
not expand the scope of responsibilities to include the regula-
tion and enforcement of minimum universal standards estab-
lished by it. This view rationalizes that, according to the
Chicago Convention, the obligation to regulate and enforce the
SARPs established by the ICAO is imposed only on the States
(not on the ICAO), therefore, the States, not the ICAO through
an IFFAS, are responsible for fixing aviation safety deficiencies
within their territory.
Second, the opponents of an increased role of the ICAO em-
phasize the success of existing technical and financial assistance
mechanisms that help developing/LDC countries remedy avia-
tion safety deficiencies. For example, it has been argued that an
IFFAS duplicates the ICAO's existing technical cooperation
mechanisms. 70 Furthermore, various improvements to the ex-
isting structures, programmes, policies, and procedures are
sometimes proposed to facilitate needy States in securing
assistance.
Third, it has been argued that an IFFAS would effectively
cause the ICAO to enter the banking business. Thus, ICAO
finds itself in an unconventional role (possibly violating the Chi-
70 See ICAO/Air Transport Bureau Website on the IFFAS, available at www.icao.
org (last visited Sept. 1, 2003) [hereinafter IFTAS Website]. This argument has
been challenged by IFFAS proponents. For example, while the IFFAS will be a
financial facility or a mechanism to provide financial support (loans and/or
grants) to States, the Technical Cooperation Bureau has a different responsibility
of providing technical and financial assistance to States for the development and
implementation of technical cooperation projects, as well as for the mobilization
of funds.
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cago Convention) in which it lacks experience, expertise, and
appropriate financing.
Fourth, the carriers of certain developed States have argued
that an IFFAS is potentially anti-competitive in that it gives an
indirect subsidy to certain developing/LDC country carriers
through its assistance to the developing/LDC States to remedy
aviation safety deficiencies.
B. ISSUE 2: DESCRIBING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
FACILITY FOR AVIATION SAFETY (IFFAS)
There is an ongoing debate of the nature and scope of the
ICAO's role in helping needy developing/LDC countries rem-
edy their aviation safety deficiencies identified in the ICAO's
USOAP. However, it is clear that the ICAO Assembly has man-
dated such a role in requiring the ICAO Council to establish an
IFFAS. Thus, the Council, during its 166th and 167th Sessions,
tried to reconcile the conflicting visions of an IFFAS, and on
December 4, 2002 (during its 167th Session), the Council estab-
lished an IFFAS by approving and adopting its draft Administra-
tive Charter.v1 Since December 4, 2002, and untilJune 13, 2003,
transitional rules (approved and adopted by the Council on De-
cember 4, 2002) applied, which required the ICAO Secretary-
General to prepare a work programme, a timetable, a proposed
budget, and to engage in other activities to effectively launch
the IFFAS until the governing body of the IFFAS assumes con-
trol.72 It is heuristic to study the IFFAS in terms of: (1) its his-
71 At the 167th Session of the ICAO Council on Dec. 4, 2002, the Council
passed a Resolution related to the establishment of the IFFAS that states:
Considering that the ICAO Assembly, in Resolution A33-10, re-
quested the Council to pursue the establishment of IFFAS as a mat-
ter of priority early in the 2002-2004 triennium on the basis, inter
alia, of an administrative charter;
THE COUNCIL:
1. Approves and adopts the Administrative Charter of the International
Financial Facility for Aviation Safety establishing IFFAS as set out in
the Attachment hereto; and
2. Urges Contracting States, international organizations and public
and private parties associated with international civil aviation to
make voluntary contributions to IFFAS.
See IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org. (respecting Administra-
tive Charter).
72 The transitional rules and their implementation are outside the scope of
this paper. For more details on theses rnles, see ICAO Council, Working Paper
No. C-WP/11907, Nov. 22, 2002, 2.16 - 2.21 & attachment 3, app. A.
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tory; (2) its principal objective and function; and (3) the
developing structure and operations of the IFFAS.
1. The History of IFFAS
The idea of creating a financial mechanism to assist certain
States with their aviation needs in international air transport has
been discussed at the ICAO for a long time. The original con-
cept originated in 1946 and proposed a "common fund" for the
provision of airports and air navigation facilities. Subsequently,
the joint financing mechanisms developed under which 23 Con-
tracting States to the Icelandic and Danish Agreements cur-
rently assumed-and continue to assume-financial
responsibility for the provision and operation of certain facilities
and services provided for civil aircraft flying across the North
Atlantic. The costs incurred are recovered through user
charges.
In the early 1980s, a novel concept fed the idea of an interna-
tional aviation financial mechanism, the concept now known as
Communications, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Manage-
ment (CNS/ATM) systems. This stimulated the ICAO to ad-
dress specific financial effects arising out of the sharing of
satellite systems for air navigation. 4
The birth and development of the IFFAS concept has as-
sumed the active involvement of the three principal institutions
of the ICAO, the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat in a
supporting role.
a. Assembly of ICAO Initiates
In 1995, the 31st Session of the ICAO Assembly approved the
concept of an International Financial Facility for Aviation Safety
(IFFAS). This was the result of a deliberation on a proposal by
eight States (members of the Latin American Civil Aviation
Commission (LACAC)) to study the need, appropriateness, and
usefulness of establishing an International Aeronautical Mone-
tary Fund (IAMF). These countries argued that many States had
problems financing investments in airports, air navigation ser-
73 See IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org (respecting ICAO
Study of an International Financial Facility for Aviation Safety (1999) at ch. 1)
[hereinafter Study of IFFAS].
74 Id.
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vices infrastructure, and the like, necessitating a search for less
onerous and rigid mechanisms than normal financial markets. 7 5
The IAMF concept was studied by the ICAO Secretariat in the
1995-1998 triennium period of the ICAO and was endorsed by
certain important civil aviation bodies. 76 In 1998, the 32nd Ses-
sion of the ICAO Assembly endorsed plans for further study on
the creation of a fund in the ICAO's next triennium (1998-
2001). Indeed, an extensive Secretariat study carried out in
1998 demonstrated that not only was there a need to finance
aviation safety-related projects in certain developing/LDC coun-
tries, but also there were no funding mechanisms within the ex-
isting aviation system to provide financing for these needs.77
The 1998 Assembly envisioned a broader scope to the IAMF's
financial assistance responsibilities than the IFFAS of today. 78
In 2001, the 33rd Session of the Assembly adopted Resolution
A33-10,79 entitled the Establishment of an International Finan-
cial Facility for Aviation Safety (IFFAS). This Resolution noted
the work carried out during the triennium, endorsed the IFFAS
concept, and requested that the Council pursue the establish-
ment of an IFFAS as "a matter of priority early in the 2002-2004
triennium, having regard to the applicable laws of Contracting
States."80 The Assembly also stated its expectation that the
Council formulate appropriate management, administrative,
and legal strategies toward the initial implementation of the IF-
FAS within the 2002-2004 triennium.8 1
75 The context of these developments is outlined in ICAO Assembly (31st Ses-
sion), Working Paper No. A31-WP/73, EX/26, (1995) at 2.
76 IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org. The IAMF concept
was endorsed by two significant bodies: the Directors-General of Civil Aviation
Conference on a Global Strategy for Safety Oversight in 1997 and the Worldwide
Communications, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management Systems
[CNS/ATM] Implementation Conference in 1998.
77 IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org.
78 See Study of IFFAS, supra note 73, at ch. 1, available at www.icao.org. The
broader role of the IAMF was to help not only projects related to the ICAO safety
oversight programme but also the global implementation of components of
CNS/ATM systems, and improvement and expansion of airport and air naviga-
tion services infrastructure, where this is aimed at overcoming identified safety
deficiencies.
79 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61. The 2001 Assembly benefited from an in-
depth Secretariat Study prepared and submitted to the Assembly for considera-
tion. See Study of IlFAS, supra note 73.
80 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 3.
81 See IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org.
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b. The Council of the ICAO Deliberates, Establishes and
Implements
In discharging its Assembly-mandated obligation to establish
an IFFAS, the ICAO Council has, through applying the principle
of "consensus," navigated through deeply divided positions.
Moreover, the Council decision-making process has involved
mandating and considering a number of studies and associated
draft proposals from various working groups over its last few ses-
sions (165th, 166th, and 167th).82
On December 4, 2002 (during its 167th Session), the ICAO
Council studied, approved, and adopted the proposed Adminis-
trative Charter of the IFFAS (prepared by a working group),
thereby establishing the IFFAS.83 At the same time, the Council
adopted a Resolution relating to transitional arrangements for
the implementation of the IFFAS during the transitional period
(between December 4, 2002 and June 13, 2003). Important im-
mediate results of these Council actions were that the ICAO Sec-
retary-General of performed certain duties and the ICAO
82 "Consensus" is a tool that the President of the ICAO Council, Dr. Assad
Kotaite, uses to avoid confrontational votes and to eventually arrive at decisions
in Council proceedings. For example, in the 165th Session of the Council (Jan./
Feb. 2002), the Council was unable to reach a consensus on two important but
complicated papers. To facilitate the eventual development of a consensus, the
Council decided to proceed with further study by creating two distinct study
groups (of different State members) that met in parallel.
The first paper resulted in a study group that dealt with establishing the IFFAS as
a mechanism to help remedy USOAP identified aviation safety deficiencies (the
concern of this article). The second paper resulted in a study group that ad-
dressed war risk insurance issues resulting from the aftermath of the September
11th, 2001, tragedy (not the concern of this article). ICAO Council, Working
Paper No. C-WP/117855, Feb. 13. 2002, at 1.1.
Subsequently, in its 166th Session (May/June 2002), the ICAO Council and its
deliberations over the paper emanating from the IFFAS Study Group (ICAO
Council, Working Paper No. C-WP/11840, May 21, 2002) continued with many
questions respecting the functions, structure, and the draft proposed administra-
tive charter of the IFFAS. The Council concluded that further work was neces-
sary for the completion of the draft Administrative Charter and requested that
the President, in consultation with member Representatives, establish a small (six
Council members) working group to reise the charter, taking into account the
reservations expressed in the (9th and 10th) Council meetings. The working
group reported back to the Council at its 167th Session (Nov./Dec. 2002) with
many proposals on the creation of the IFFAS. The Council adopted, with some
modification, most of the proposals.
83 Culled from discussions at the 167th Session of the ICAO Council on Dec. 4,
2002.
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Council selected a Governing Body that has assumed control of
the IFFAS. 4
2. The Principal Objective and Function of the IFFAS
The overriding objective of the IFFAS is to function as a "not
for profit fund" to help finance projects that "remedy or miti-
gate safety-related deficiencies"85 "for which States cannot other-
wise provide or obtain the necessary financial resources."8 6 To
achieve this primary objective of financially assisting countries in
improving aviation safety, the IFFAS follows two key guidelines:
first, the IFFAS will only financially facilitate needy projects and
countries that lack the resources to remedy aviation safety defi-
ciencies; 7 and second, the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Pro-
gramme (USOAP) (as an element of ICAO's Global Aviation
Safety Plan (GASP)) is considered the preferred instrument to
help the IFFAS identify the greatest needs in choosing and pri-
oritizing projects to be funded.88
84 As stated earlier, the transitional rules and their implementation are outside
the scope of this paper. For more details on theses rules, see Working Paper No.
C-WP/11907, supra note 72.
85 ICAO Council, Administrative Charter of the IFFAS, at art. 2.1. See IFFAS
Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org. Article 2.1 of this Administrative
Charter provides:
IFFAS shall be a not for profit fund, embodying a mechanism to
provide financial assistance for safety-related projects for which
States cannot otherwise provide or obtain the necessary financial
resources. The principal area of application of assistance shall be
to remedy or mitigate safety-related deficiencies identified through
the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP)
as an element of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP).
Id.
86 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61.
87 Id.
88 Id. In addition to the principles established in Resolution A33-10, aviation
safety is one of the most important factors in civil aviation, and it is recognized by
the ICAO Strategic Action Plan as being a major element of consideration within
the ICAO. In clause 2 of Assembly Resolution A33-9, (resolving deficiencies iden-
tified by the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme and encouraging qual-
ity assurance for technical cooperation projects) who urges the Secretary General
to ensure that the ICAO provides, when requested, reasonable assistance within
available resources, to help States to obtain the necessary financial resources to
fund assistance projects by Contracting States, industry organizations, or inde-
pendent consultants. See IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org.
Unlike the broader mandate of the 1998 ICAO Assembly, today's IFFAS is no
longer to be concerned with financially assisting either the components of CNS/
ATM systems or the improvement and expansion of airport and air navigation
services infrastructure.
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3. The Developing Structure and Operation of the IFFAS
In Resolution A33-10, the Assembly gave the ICAO Council
the general responsibility to establish the IFFAS, specific guide-
lines that it be constituted of five main components in terms of
the structure and operational procedures,8 "1 and granted the
Council an oversight function.90 The ICAO Council has largely
satisfied the Assembly mandate by approving and adopting the
IFFAS transitional Administrative Charter on December 4, 2002.
This Administrative Charter incorporates the following five key
elements that are in various stages of implementation:
1) Consistent with the Assembly mandate, the Administrative
Charter draws some distinctions among members, contrib-
utors, participants, and possible beneficiaries."' The IF-
FAS membership (as well as contributors) is to be
voluntary and broad-based to include not only ICAO Con-
tracting States but also international aviation-related orga-
nizations (private and public), airlines, airports, air
navigation service suppliers, manufacturers of airframes,
engines and avionics, other members of the aerospace in-
dustry, and civil society.92 Moreover, States voluntarily
both participate in the IFFAS and benefit from IFFAS
assistance."
2) Consistent with the Assembly guidelines, the IFFAS Ad-
ministrative Charter provides that the ICAO and IFFAS
will operate as distinctive entities. On one hand, legally
the IFFAS "shall keep ICAO harmless with regard to all
819 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 7. The Assembly has asked the Coun-
cil to report back to the Assembly (at its next session in the fall of 2004) on the
progress of the IFFAS.
Id. at art. 3(a). This charter spells out principles of operation of the IFFAS
and requires a Council resolution approving the charter. See IFFAS Website, supra
note 70, available at www.icao.org.
9 1 Working Paper No. C-WP/ 11907, supra note 72, at 2.5.
92 See id; see also Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 6; see IFFAS Website, supra
note 70, available at www.icao.org. Article 3.4 of this Administrative Charter
provides:
Subject to Article V, IFFAS shall derive its resources from voluntary
contributions made by ICAO Contracting States, international or-
ganizations (public and private) working in the field of interna-
tional aviation or associated with it, airlines, airports, air navigation
services providers, manufacturers of airframes, engines, avionics
and other aircraft components, other members of the aerospace
industry, and civil society.
Id. at art. 3.4.
93 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at arts. 2(b)(1), 5(b).
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claims, demands or legal actions by third parties arising
from or relating to the operation of IFFAS."9 4 On the
other hand, financially, the IFFAS is to be funded com-
pletely independent of the ICAO Programme Budget.95
More specifically, any services provided by the ICAO are to
be "only upon request of participating States and on a
cost-recovery basis."9 6
The Administrative Charter provides that the sources of fund-
ing of the IFFAS are generally voluntary and relatively limited,
and stipulated as follows:
a) voluntary contributions from Contracting States and other
contributing parties;
b) interest earned on loans;
c) miscellaneous income from bank deposits and
investments;
d) contributions resulting from the crediting of any amount
of Contracting States' shares of any distributable surplus
from the ICAO Regular Budget; or
e) other voluntary contributions by way of pledge, loans from
banks for reinvestment in projects based on the line of
credit from international, regional and sub-regional devel-
opment banks and financial institutions.97
The result is that contributions to the IFFAS will be voluntary
for both funding projects in States and for operating the IFFAS
itself.98 For example, States are encouraged to contribute to the
IFFAS by annually crediting their share of any distributable sur-
plus (that is held in trust by the ICAO) from the ICAO Pro-
gramme Budget to the IFFAS account.99 Accordingly, as of
January 1, 2003, 47 ICAO Member States had contributed
$222,709 USD. Furthermore, the European Commission has
pledged 200,000 Euros for each of the years of 2002 and 2003.00
Other interested parties (such as private and public interna-
94 Administrative Charter, Attachment to ICAO State Letter M1 1/ 1-02/114, at
art. 3.3 (Dec. 31, 2002), available at http://www.icao.int/iffas/index.html.
- Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 2(b) (4). See also IFFAS Website, supra
note 70, available at www.icao.org. Article 3.3 of this Administrative Charter pro-
vides: "IFFAS shall operate with complete independence from ICAO's Regular
Budget." Id.
6 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 2(b)(5).
97 Administrative Charter, supra note 94, at art. 9.1.
98 Working Paper No. C-WP/1 1907, supra note 72, at art. 2.4.
-' Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 5(a), (c).
I00 Culled from discussions at the 167th Session of the ICAO Council at the
ICAO headquarters, Montreal, Canada (Dec. 4, 2002).
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tional aviation-related organizations, airlines, airports, air navi-
gation service suppliers, aircraft/engine/avionics manufac-
turers, civil society, etc.) are also encouraged to make voluntary
contributions in the future.10'
3) Conforming to the Assembly requirements, the IFFAS in-
cludes a Governing Body, appointed by the ICAO Council,
whose members are nominated by participating States and
other participating parties.10 2 In the charter, the ICAO
President of the Council and the Secretary General have a
right to participate in the meetings of the Governing Body
without a voting right.' This Governing Body is responsi-
ble for running the IFFAS and deciding what projects to
fund and on what terms," 4 but with obvious accountability
to the ICAO in general and the ICAO Council in particu-
lar. This is clear from a careful reading of the specific
functions outlined in the Administrative Charter where it
is stated that the Governing Body shall:
a) formulate the policy or polices for the activities of
IFFAS...;
b) approve the annual work programme and budget of IF-
FAS after consultations with the Council;
c) receive, examine and approve the financial statements
of IFFAS;
d) monitor and evaluate the activities of IFFAS and review
and report on them on an annual basis to the ICAO
Council, participating States and other participating
parties;
e) actively promote participation in IFFAS by Contracting
States and other participating parties;
f) negotiate arrangements with the parties referred to in
e) above regarding participation in IFFAS;
g) propose to the ICAO Council from time to time ways
and means of enhancing the financial resources of IF-
FAS, with a view to ensuring the effectiveness and con-
tinuity of its operation; and
101 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 6. See also Administrative Charter,
supra note 94, at art. 3.4.
102 Administrative Charter, supra note 94, at arts. 6.1, 6.2.
103 Id. at art. 6.4. This conforms to Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art.
3(b).
104 Working Paper No. C-WP/11907, supra note 72, at 2.5.
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h) develop and keep up to date a compendium of the
working procedures of IFFAS to serve as a procedural
manual. 105
The IFFAS Governing Body is not yet functional. In fact, it
has not yet met. The President of the Council, by authority del-
egated to him by the Council, on June 18, 2003, appointed eight
members to the Governing Body. The Administrative Charter
allows for a minimum of eight and a maximum of 11 members.
The other three seats may be reserved for regional organizations
and the private sector that might contribute to the IFFAS later.
The IFFAS governing body is expected to sit in its first meeting
in October 2003. 106
4) The Administrative Charter incorporates limited ICAO
"staffing to support [the IFFAS] and to cover daily execu-
tive and administrative functions."' '7 First, "in consulta-
tion with the Governing Body and the President of the
Council of ICAO, the Secretary General of ICAO shall ap-
point to IFFAS: (a) an ICAO official to act as Secretary to
the Governing Body of IFFAS; and (b) an ICAO official to
act as Secretary to the Expert Panel"' 0 (advisory group).
Second, "in consultation with the Governing Body and the
President of the Council of ICAO, and in response to a
request from the [IFFAS] Governing Body, the Secretary
General of ICAO may... provide IFFAS with administrative
assistance in addition to the appointments" just men-
tioned,109 all on a full-time or part-time, and "on a full cost-
recovery basis."110
105 Administrative Charter, supra note 94, at art. 6.7.
-0 Culled from private discussions with members of the ICAO Secretariat, at
the Montreal, Canada headquarters (Sept. 4, 2003).
107 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 3(b). One opinion on the nature of
the staff servicing of the IFFAS argues that Assembly Resolution A33-10 provides
for a management structure within the ICAO legal regime. Thus, according to
Article 54(h) of the Chicago Convention, any staff benefiting from ICAO status is
under the authority of the ICAO's chief executive officer, appointed by the
Council, i.e. the Secretary General. Moreover, such staff shall be subject to rules
established by Council, per Article 58 of the Convention (Staff Regulations). An
example may be taken in this regard from the African Civil Aviation Commission
(AFCAC), the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and the Latin Ameri-
can Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC), where staff are officially ICAO staff and
have contracts signed by the Secretary General, under the "service" authority of
whom they stand. See IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org.
108 Administrative Charter, supra note 94, at art. 8.1.
o, Id. at art. 8.2.
110 Id. at art. 8.3.
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5) The Administrative Charter incorporates certain opera-
tional policies and procedures for the IFFAS that reflect
the Assembly's guidelines. First, it is agreed that IFFAS
governance and its management principles are to be based
on transparency, sound, simple management," 1 and ac-
countability with clear administrative and financial guide-
lines to be stipulated and followed.' 1 2
Disputes exist, however, on issues of governance and the rela-
tionship with the ICAO. On one hand, some argue that Assem-
bly Resolution 33-10 states that IFFAS's "management strategy"
should be "developed on the principles of, and in conformity
with, the existing ICAO legal regimes,"'1 3 meaning that the crea-
tion of a new legal entity with its own legal personality is not
envisaged. 14 For example, in this view, there is an ICAO audit-
ing system in the "existing ICAO legal regime," that could be
made formally and directly applicable to IFFAS. The IFFAS be-
ing under the ICAO's umbrella, would be subject to the external
(and possibly internal) auditor's jurisdiction and the ICAO
might recover the additional costs from the IFFAS." 5 On the
other hand, some commentators have disagreed with this posi-
tion and suggest that the Council should eventually approve the
creation of a separate and autonomous entity with transparency
and accountability not linked to the ICAO in most respects.
A second issue related to the IFFAS' operational policies and
procedures is that respecting the Assembly's desires, the Council
has consistently favoured the idea of the global application of
I Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 3(d).
112 Id. at art. 3(d)(1), (2). There will be "clear criteria and procedures for the
granting of loans and conducting any other financial transactions" using ICAO
standards, policies, and procedures. Id. at art. 3(d) (3). Moreover, there are to
be safeguards to ensure the proper, effective, and efficient application of funds
from participating States. Id. at art. 3(d) (4). This suggests that there will have to
be a clear distinction and identification of funds used for the administration of
the IFFAS and for financial assistance provided toward safety-related projects. See
IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org. Moreover, there are to be
"measures to assure quality control and to assess effectiveness and efficiency at all
levels" and adequate "provision for the auditing of accounts." Resolution A33-10,
supra note 61, at art. 3(d)(5)-(6).
113 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 3(c).
114 See IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org. This view consid-
ers that the appropriate legal basis for the IFFAS is enshrined in Chapter XV of
the Chicago Convention, particularly articles 69 and 70.
115 See IFFAS Website, supra note 70, available at www.icao.org. There is an inter-
esting discussion as to "What system of quality control and auditing would the
IFFAS employ?"
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principles on a regional basis. Accordingly, the IFFAS will apply
globally "a framework of common guidelines and operating
rules with flexibility for implementation" regionally." 6
In sum, the IFFAS is a quasi-independent and self-financed
entity (i.e., outside of the ICAO's budget). Some commentators
have interpreted that the ICAO has three main functions in rela-
tionship to the IFFAS: first, the ICAO supervises the IFFAS in
assuring that any deficiencies identified through the ICAO's au-
diting process are remedied; second, the ICAO provides admin-
istrative and technical service support to the IFFAS (to minimize
IFFAS costs) on a cost-recovery basis (for example, ICAO's Tech-
nical Cooperation Bureau may not only help procure the client
State's aviation goods and services, but may also finally certify
their delivery at quality assured standards); and third, the
ICAO's audited finance processes will authorize payment to the
suppliers-not the client States-of the goods and services con-
tracted. In the end, the client States will have to pay back the
loans they secure through the IFFAS process.
C. ISSUE 3: THE FUTURE OF THE IFFAS
The remainder of this paper examines three outstanding
questions associated with the nature, scope, and development of
the IFFAS from today until the future: (1) the IFFAS has been
created on a compromise basis as neither a "Giant" nor a
"Dwarf;" (2) sources of funding the IFFAS; and (3) the status of
the IFFAS as part of the ICAO or as a distinct and independent
entity.
1. The IFFAS as neither a "Giant" nor a "Dwarf'
The draft Administrative Charter emanating from the ICAO
Council on December 4, 2002, reflects an intriguing compro-
mise developed by the working group that prepared it. The
working group deliberated on whether the IFFAS should pro-
vide grants or loans, and this deliberation bridged the schism
that has divided States into two distinct visions of the IFFAS and
116 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 2(b) (3). It has been suggested that
the regional applicability of the IFFAS will be in cooperation with regional finan-
cial institutions and such regional bodies as the African Civil Aviation Commis-
sion (AFCAC), the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and the Latin
American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC). See IFFAS Website, supra note 70,
available at www.icao.org.
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its role in remedying the aviation safety deficiencies of develop-
ing/LDC countries identified in the USOAP.
a. The Giant
The first vision has been that the IFFAS should begin as a "Gi-
ant." This vision conceives that the IFFAS might assume certain
functions of an international bank that directs money to remedy
aviation safety deficiencies identified by ICAO audits in needy
countries. The IFFAS would have broad powers to lend, a so-
phisticated structure, and deep-pocket financing. This ap-
proach has been particularly popular among developing/LDC
countries (especially by those who expect to benefit from the
IFFAS financial assistance). 1 7
The Giant IFFAS idea has been criticized by developed coun-
tries that often consider the IFFAS as an indirect form of "for-
eign aid" from the developed to the developing/LDC countries.
Many donor developed countries are reluctant to give up con-
trol of how the assistance will be spent in the recipient develop-
ing/LDC countries by delegating power over foreign aid project
priorities and spending to another institution (like IFFAS);
these countries generally prefer to choose the projects and the
regions where the money will be spent."" Moreover, there is a
resistance to allowing recipient States to remedy the deficiencies
themselves and spend the money as they wish. These criticisms
have given birth to an alternative view of the IFFAS as a Dwarf.
b. The Dwarf
This view suggests a gradualist and evolutionary approach
where the IFFAS should start as a "Dwarf." Rather than being a
lending institution, the IFFAS should begin with a limited struc-
ture and restricted powers. The IFFAS would be a facilitator by
providing information and helping prepare professional "banka-
ble" detailed project proposals and reports, and an intermediary
by helping needy countries seek financial and technical assis-
tance through existing mechanisms such as international, re-
gional development, or national banks. Many developed and
some developing countries have favored this approach.
117 Singh, supra note 50. The author culled the nature of this position in dis-
cussions with Representative Singh, who does not agree with all the elements of
this position.
I1s Stimpson, supra note 38.
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This IFFAS would operate as an umbrella entity with its head
office (probably in Montreal) providing financial (information),
administrative, and quality assurance (i.e., oversight) services to
needy countries and approved projects. However, the work of
such an IFFAS would probably be implemented regionally." 9 In
this view, the IFFAS would initially work on a few pilot projects
so as to build a track record and credibility for future assess-
ment.1 2 The guiding management principles, reiterating As-
sembly Resolution A33-10, would be accountability, efficiency,
effectiveness, and transparency. 121
c. The Compromise
The draft Administrative Charter coming from the ICAO
Council on December 4, 2002, is a rather interesting compro-
mise developed by the working group that prepared it. The
working group deliberated on whether the IFFAS should pro-
vide grants or loans, and thus tenuously bridged the Giant and
Dwarf dispute.
On one hand, some in the working group suggested that the
IFFAS should only provide outright grants to remedy needy
country USOAP identified safety deficiencies. This would avoid
bankers' problems in making loans, such as the credit-worthi-
ness of the beneficiaries, interest rates, appropriate repayment
periods, and bad debts. Moreover, grants recognize the
probability that the initial beneficiaries of the IFFAS would be
countries that already suffer from incredible debt loads and are
seriously challenged to pay back the principal and small interest
on IFFAS loans. 122
On the other hand, the majority in the working group consid-
ered that the IFFAS should be designed to be self-financing and
119 Singh, supra note 50.
120 Id.
121 Stimpson, supra note 38.
122 Working Paper No. C-WP/11907, supra note 72, at 2.7. The Representative
of Australia, in terms of his personal position-as a member of the Council, from
Australia, but participating in the work of the group on an individual/indepen-
dent basis-was a strong advocate of this position. It was suggested that an IFFAS
should provide outright grants and subsidies-rather than loans as presently en-
visaged-to countries needing assistance. Such assistance-money and exper-
tise-could be used to facilitate efforts to obtain further necessary assistance
from other sources. The main benefit of this proposal is that it could channel
assistance money directly to the particular aviation projects and needy LDC coun-
tries. Interview with Jonathan Aleck, Representative of Australia on the Council
of ICAO (July 25 & 29, 2002).
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that beneficiary countries would feel a greater commitment to a
project financed by a loan that had to be repaid. This view is
closer to the spirit of Assembly Resolution A33-10.1
23
The draft Administrative Charter follows the second approach
and states that the IFFAS will provide "financial assis-
tance... primarily by way of loans.. .[and] usually.. .at conces-
sionary interest rates and... [with] short, medium or long term
duration.' 24 However, in recognition of the advantages of
grants, the IFFAS has the flexibility of awarding grants and zero
interest loans in exceptional circumstances where the Gov-
erning Body deems it appropriate and necessary.1 25 In all cases,
however, "projects considered for financial assistance shall be
subject to detailed technical, financial and economic
appraisal."'12
6
2. Sources of Funding of the IFFAS
The issue of "where is the money going to come from"127 to
start and develop the IFFAS is probably the biggest concern of
all interested parties. Whether the IFFAS begins as a Dwarf or a
Giant, millions of dollars of start-up capital are required. The
sources of funding for the IFFAS will ultimately affect the capac-
ity of the IFFAS to assist needy developing/LDC client States to
finance projects to remedy safety deficiencies.
Assembly Resolution A33-10 assured that the establishment of
the IFFAS does not constitute another mandatory foreign aid
instrument transferring funds from developed countries to
needy developing/LDC countries. Moreover, as discussed ear-
lier, this Resolution provided three requirements for IFFAS
funding: (1) IFFAS is to be developed, established, and oper-
ated with "complete independence from ICAO's Programme
Budget;" 2 (2) to launch the IFFAS, States are encouraged to
make "voluntary contributions to finance the preparatory work
in the development of the IFFAS;"' 29 and (3) other interested
parties are also encouraged to make voluntary contributions to
IFFAS. 130
123 Working Paper No. C-WP/11907, supra note 72, at 2.7.
124 Administrative Charter, supra note 94, at art. 4.5.
125 Id.
126 Jd. at art. 4.6.
127 Aleck, supra note 37; Stimpson, supra note 38; Dupuis, supra note 39.
128 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 2(b)(4).
-_ ) Id. at art. 5(a).
130 Id. at art. 6.
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As of September 1, 2003, the voluntary contributions prom-
ised from various sources totaled approximately two million dol-
lars. There are presently three main sources of "voluntary
contributions." First, States have voluntarily committed various
sums to the IFFAS specifically.' 3 ' A second source of funding is
the over $3 million USD in arrears received from Contracting
States and held under a special long-outstanding arrears ac-
count. The Council, seeking guidance on how to allocate these
surplus contributions among IFFAS, aviation security and other
purposes, submitted the question to the 34th Session [Extraordi-
nary] of the ICAO Assembly in Montreal March 31 to April 1,
2003.132 The Assembly deliberations decided that the surplus of
contributions should be split three ways equally among IFFAS,
aviation security purposes [AVSEC] and safety oversight. 33 A
third funding source is other interested parties who are en-
couraged to make voluntary contributions in the future.' Ac-
cordingly, the European Commission was the first such
contributor pledging 200,000 Euros for each year of 2002 and
2003.135
The relatively small amount of seed money presently commit-
ted to the IFFAS mechanism has been subject to two conflicting
interpretations. On one hand, IFFAS proponents suggest that
this is a great start and that once the IFFAS actively solicits con-
tributions, the funds will pour in. On the other hand, IFFAS
skeptics argue that today's paltry contributions reflect a lack of
strong support for the IFFAS mechanism. Thus, a risk exists
that the under-funded IFFAS accounts might soon be drained,
causing the IFFAS to collapse. 36 Moreover, many of the usual
major contributors to ICAO initiatives have indicated that they
131 The first and earliest commitments, around the time that the Administra-
tive Charter was adopted in December 2002, was that 47 ICAO Member States
had contributed $222,709 USD to the IFFAS project (as part of their share of the
ICAO programme budgetary surplus with the average contribution of $4,745
USD, and over one-third of these contributions coming from France $90,700
USD). The amounts and interpretations are based on this writer's notes and
culled from discussions at the 167th Session of the ICAO Council at ICAO head-
quarters, Montreal, Canada (Dec. 4, 2002).
132 See ICAO Assembly, Working Paper No. A34-WP/3 (Feb. 12, 2003).
133 Culled from private discussions with members of the ICAO Secretariat, at
the Montreal, Canada headquarters (Sept. 4, 2003).
134 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 6.
35 Culled from private discussions with members of the ICAO Secretariat and
Council members, at the Montreal, Canada headquarters (Dec. 4, 2002).
- The interpretations are based on this writer's notes of various positions
voiced and culled from discussions at the 166th Session of the ICAO Council
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will only pledge money to the IFFAS when their main reserva-
tions are addressed, such as the drafting of a proper "Business
Plan that will attract funds."137
The IFFAS clearly requires more funding both in terms of the
variety of sources and total amount received. Accordingly, on
an administrative level, in preparation of the money search, the
ICAO Secretary-General has had to satisfy the Transitional Rules
of the IFFAS requiring him to "prepare and submit to the Coun-
cil during the 168th Session (February 2003), a work pro-
gramme, a timetable and a projected budget." 38 On a financial
level, to address the challenge of increasing the funding intake,
the Secretary-General was mandated to spend money from the
exclusive IFFAS account on such matters as "raising and secur-
ing funds and accumulating capital, with a view to providing for
the necessary administration and essential operations of IF-
FAS...1 39 Thus, in support of the fund search, the ICAO Secre-
tariat continues to work on a framework for an informational/
promotional programme to seek contributions and support
from States, organizations, banks, airlines, airports, aerospace
manufactures, and civil society in general. 40
The reality that IFFAS funding is based on the principle of
voluntary contributions has two principal limitations. First, legal
reservations have been put forward respecting the question of
whether sub-national entities can legally contribute to a fund
(like IFFAS) that is created by an international treaty mandated
institution like the ICAO. 41 Second, since the membership,
participation and funding of the IFFAS are based on the con-
cept of voluntarism, IFFAS revenues might fluctuate wildly, such
that the vagaries of contributor whims will possibly affect the
quantity and quality of projects in which the IFFAS can and will
assist.
(June 6 & 10, 2002), and 167th Session at ICAO headquarters, Montreal, Canada
(Dec. 4, 2002).
137 Dupuis, supra note 39.
138 Working Paper No. G-WP/11907, supra note 72, at app. A, Transitional
Rules, at art.10.
This is required for "preparatory work which is necessary to initiate and ensure
the effective and efficient operation of IFFAS." Id. at app. A, Transitional Rules,
at art. 8.
139 Id. at app. A, Transitional Rules, at art. 9(a).
140 Culled from discussions with various members of the ICAO Secretariat at
the ICAO headquarters, Montreal, Canada (Mar./Apr. 2003).
141 Dupuis, supra note 39.
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Other funding mechanisms will eventually likely have to be
used to complement voluntary contributions. While these
mechanisms are outside the scope of this paper, it is worth men-
tioning some of the options. First, there are two working mod-
els presently operating within the ICAO context that may at least
partly serve as a template for the IFFAS to generate a steady rev-
enue stream and assure cost-recovery-there is not only the
TCB experience discussed earlier, but also a regional analogy of
joint financing agreements to fund air navigation services that
has been successfully administered by the ICAO over many
years. 4 2
Second, another possible source of IFFAS funding (that was
proposed and rejected by the ICAO Assembly at the time of the
defunct forbearer of the IFFAS-the International Aeronautical
Monetary Fund) is to apply a mandatory charge/levy to every
passenger ticket sold (e.g., an additional one U.S. dollar per
ticket). This charge might be applied world-wide and/or re-
gionally. On the global level, an example is to apply this
formula to the scheduled traffic volume of 2002. Since the com-
mercial airlines of the 188 ICAO Contracting States carried ap-
proximately 1,615 million passengers, 43 the proposed fund
would have generated at least $1.615 billion USD. On the re-
gional level, the ICAO Council has discussed the possibility of a
regional charge/levy that is collected and disbursed by the IF-
FAS (for aviation-related projects) in those developing/LDC
countries that have difficulty organizing themselves for this pur-
pose.1" Even if such a charge is not applied globally, and only
applied to a hypothetical 20 percent of the passenger tickets
sold in the developing/LDC States (and possibly a few devel-
142 See Abeyratne, supra note 57, at 397-99 for details. Joint financing agree-
ments are mentioned earlier in this paper. They constitute proof that it is possi-
ble to establish and administer a fund that implements the ICAO SARPs on air
navigation through the implementation of global safety standards. Id. at 397.
Many years ago, 23 ICAO Contracting States signed the Icelandic and Danish
Joint Financing Agreements under the auspices of ICAO. These signatory States
currently assume financial responsibility for the provision and operation of cer-
tain air navigation and traffic facilities and services provided for civil aircraft fly-
ing across the North Atlantic, north of the 45th latitude, and the costs incurred
are recovered through user charges. Id. at 397-98. Although these joint financ-
ing models are helpful precedents, it must be emphasized that the creation of an
IFFAS is distinctive in the nature and scope of its functions as well as structure.
Id. at 398-99.
143 Annual Report of the Council (2002), supra note 24, at 2.
144 Interview with Daniel Galibert, President of the Air Navigation Commission
of ICAO (May 7, 2002).
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oped countries), over $320 million USD would have been gener-
ated in 2002.
In the long-run, for the IFFAS to be successful, a solution
must be developed soon to increase its sources and amount of
funding. Accordingly, this leads to an ethical question that in-
volves political priorities: is a one U.S. dollar charge/levy (per
ticket) excessive-whether applied globally or regionally-given
the high risks to aviation safety discussed in this paper and the
willingness of so many governments to impose much larger
charges/levies to fund aviation security?
3. The Status of IFFAS as Part of the ICA 0 or a Distinct and
Independent Entity
The third important issue is whether the proposed IFFAS
should be under the ICAO's control or should be a distinct and
independent entity. Pragmatically, to simplify and expedite the
process, on December 4, 2002, the ICAO Council adopted the
working group's recommended approach of creating the IFFAS
within the ICAO, without a separate legal status. 145 This ap-
proach was a compromise between two conflicting positions on
the long-run status of the IFFAS in relationship to the ICAO. 4 6
On one hand, some have argued that, from birth, the IFFAS
must be established as an entity independent and distinct from
the ICAO. This view is legalistic, focusing on Assembly Resolu-
tion A33-10's requirement that IFFAS funding must have "com-
plete independence from ICAO's Programme Budget" and "any
administrative or other services" are to be provided "only by re-
quest by participating States and on a cost recovery basis."' 47 On
the other hand, others suggest that while in the short-run the
IFFAS may start under the ICAO's control, in the long-run, the
IFFAS may pick up momentum and eventually be spun out of
145 Working Paper No. C-WP/11907, supra note 72, at 2.4.
146 Id. at 2.8. The Council accepted reconciling both positions, reiterating the
working group view that the Assembly Resolution A33-10 has some ambivalence.
On the one hand, an IFFAS is to have "complete independence from ICAO's
Programme Budget" and "any administrative or other services" are to be pro-
vided "only by request by participating States and on a cost recovery basis." On
the other hand, the Assembly Resolution makes only one reference to the "ex-
isting ICAO legal regime" in the context of creating a management strategy so
that the IFFAS strncture conforms to that regime (although it may not necessarily
fall within that regime). Id.
147 Resolution A33-10, supra note 61, at art. 5(c); Working Paper No. C-WP/
11907, supra note 72, at art. 2.8.
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the ICAO as an autonomous and distinct entity"' 8 (just as "a
baby must be nurtured before it goes out on its own."). 4 9
A challenge remains to distinguish and clearly identify the IF-
FAS from the rest of the ICAO since the IFFAS will operate not
only under the ICAO legal regime without a separate legal status
but also independently of the ICAO's Programme Budget.150
Thus, the IFFAS Governing Body's accountability to the ICAO
must be clearly stated. However, although the ICAO Council
may delegate certain functions to the IFFAS Governing Body,
the Council and the ICAO Member States remain responsible
for everything done by or in the name of the IFFAS (as long as it
is part of the ICAO) .15 Accordingly, some intriguing legal ques-
tions arise as to the ICAO's potential legal liabilities for IFFAS
activities including non-performing loans extended by the IF-
FAS to client States. In recognition that a poor strategy for IF-
FAS could have devastating financial effects on the ICAO, the
IFFAS Governing Body has been mandated by the ICAO Coun-
cil (that must approve the proposals) to study various options,
including insurance and contingency funds to cover risks. 152 It
is generally agreed that whatever the IFFAS may ultimately do, it
is important that steps be taken to ensure that it does not be-
come a liability to the ICAO or the ICAO Programme Budget. 153
There are three important benefits of the IFFAS being under
the ICAO's supervisory umbrella, at least for the first few years
of its existence. First, the IFFAS provides an ICAO solution to
an ICAO objective. The IFFAS remedies a State's aviation safety
deficiencies identified in the USOAP (a programme established
to satisfy the goals of the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan).154
148 It is suggested that this approach is legally consistent with the provisions of
Assembly Resolution 33-10. One reference provides that the "management strat-
egy" of the IFFAS should be "developed on the principles of, and in conformity
with, the existing ICAO legal regime" (emphasis added). Resolution A33-10, supra
note 61, at art. 3(c).
149 Singh, supra note 50.
150 Working Paper No. C-WP/11907, supra note 72, at 2.8.
151 Id. at 2.9.
152 Id. at 2.10 - 2.11. There is no doubt that whatever liability protection is
undertaken should be proportionate to the risk, recognizing that the risks to
IFFAS and ICAO are minimal during the transitional period from December 4,
2002 toJune 13, 2003. Interview with Taieb Cherif, Representative of Algeria on
the Council of ICAO (Jan. 14, 2003).
153 Interview with Jonathan Aleck, Representative of Australia on the Council
of ICAO (Dec. 18, 2002).
154 Singh, supra note 50.
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Second, the ICAO provides administrative and technical ser-
vice support to the IFFAS on a cost-recovery basis. Some possi-
ble support functions include ICAO Secretariat processes that
may be used to procure client State aviation goods and services,
as well as to assure their delivery at quality standards (as certified
through the TCB), and ICAO Secretariat technical experts and
lawyers who may be used to minimize the costs accrued by the
LDC's in preparing detailed project reports. Furthermore, if
the IFFAS disburses its money through the ICAO, the work will
probably, but not necessarily, return to ICAO mechanisms to
the TCB.155
Third, the ICAO's audited finance processes authorize pay-
ment to the suppliers, not to the client States, of the goods and
services contracted. This assures transparency, accountability,
effectiveness, and integrity in the process.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper suggests that there is a generally acknowledged
need to remedy aviation safety deficiencies identified through
the USOAP in certain States and regions. Although the Chicago
Convention imposes a duty on the State to remedy any such di-
vergences from the SARPs requirements, the ICAO appears to
have the discretionary power to assist needy developing/LDC
States to remedy their identified aviation safety deficiencies as
the ICAO pursues its broad objective of global aviation safety
under the GASP. The nature and scope of the ICAO's role
through the IFFAS is still being determined. Nevertheless, the
IFFAS must operate under tight management principles that
provide transparency, accountability, effectiveness, and quality
control.
There are certain issues that remain to be clarified. One ques-
tion is whether the IFFAS is a "mechanism," a bank, some other
corporate body, or a fund. 15 15 Insofar as the IFFAS is less than a
full-fledged bank, it probably will grow as an umbrella organiza-
tion. Developing/LDC countries will certainly benefit from the
IFFAS as a facilitator and complementary instrument to existing
mechanisms of technical assistance (at the international, re-
gional, bilateral, multilateral, and plurilateral levels), and finan-
cial assistance (including regional development and
international banks and funds, export credit agencies, and bilat-
155 Id.
156 Working Paper No. C-WP/11907, supra note 72, at 2.4.
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eral development institutions). A second important issue cen-
ters on finding a good source of funding beyond the
voluntarism principle since the IFFAS, as presently constituted,
has not only a voluntary membership and participation, but also
is funded through voluntary contributions. 51
In the medium to long term, it can be expected that by the
next plenary session of the ICAO Assembly (Fall 2004), Con-
tracting States-whether members, participants and/or finan-
cial supporters of the IFFAS-will be able to review a few pilot
projects where financial assistance has been channeled to rem-
edy certain aviation safety deficiencies identified by the ICAO's
USOAP in particular LDC countries. Furthermore, there may
be not only a regional implementation of the ICAO's objectives
but also a role played by ICAO regional offices in implementing
IFFAS objectives.
This article is intended to present a balanced perspective to
political leaders and their citizens on the problem of and solu-
tions to assisting certain developing/LDC countries that lack the
will, ability, and/or means to remedy their USOAP identified
aviation safety deficiencies. Irrespective of whether the IFFAS
and/or other mechanisms are preferred to address this issue, it
is evident that a real safety deficiency exists threatening lives,
property, and economic interests worldwide.
An unfortunate and unnecessary schism exists today between
developed and developing/LDC country perceptions of the cri-
ses in aviation "security" and "safety." On one hand, particular
developed countries consider the pursuit of improved interna-
tional aviation "security" to be an overwhelming objective. In-
deed, they recognize an ability-to-pay principle respecting
aviation security such that richer States may financially assist
poorer States with security deficiencies. Ironically and possibly
inconsistently, many of these same countries tend to argue a
user pay principle respecting aviation safety such that the costs
to assist the remedying of safety deficiencies (for example,
through an IFFAS mechanism) should be paid for by the user
country even if it lacks the necessary resources. On the other
hand, many developing/LDC countries suggest that the pursuit
of global aviation "safety" is so important that the ability-to-pay
principle should be applied to allow the generous transfer of
resources from the developed world to those States with safety
157 As mentioned above, the Assembly mandated that the IFFAS is not to bur-
den the regular programme budget of the ICAO.
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deficiencies. These same developing countries argue that most
security system upgrade costs (including some of those in the
developing countries) should be paid for by the user countries
(i.e., the developed countries) since they have a much higher
risk of security breaches.
To conclude, the economic constraint of scarce resources and
politically dictated priorities should not divert the world's politi-
cal leaders from fairly balancing the resources allocated to civil
aviation "security" and "safety." Both civil aviation security and
safety constitute a global and indivisible system such that if civil
aviation security and/or safety are threatened in one State or
region, security and/or safety are jeopardized worldwide. The
interests of the sovereign State and international community ne-
cessitate respect for both priorities to promote the air transport
industry's development and protect passenger lives and
property.
The bottom line is that the citizens of our world have a right
to expect that sufficient resources will be committed to both
objectives - safety and security.
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